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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Aaron William Frandsen appeals from the judgment and sentences
entered upon the jury verdicts finding him guilty of 10 counts of lewd conduct
with a minor under 16.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Frandsen sexually abused his biological daughter, A.F., in multiple ways,
over multiple years, beginning when A.F. was just seven years old. (Tr., p.89,
L.14 - p.127, L.19.)

A grand jury indicted Frandsen on 10 counts of lewd

conduct with a minor under 16.
Frandsen guilty as charged.

(R., pp.9-15.)
(R., pp.196-98.)

Following a trial, a jury found
The district court entered

judgment on the jury's verdicts and imposed concurrent unified sentences of life,
with 25 years fixed. (R., pp.247-55.) Frandsen timely appealed. (R., pp.25660.)
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ISSUES

Frandsen states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court err when it admitted irrelevant and
highly prejudicial evidence over Mr. Frandsen's objection?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed
upon Mr. Frandsen ten concurrent unified life sentences,
each with twenty five years fixed, following his conviction for
ten counts of lewd conduct of a minor under the age of
sixteen?

(Appellant's brief, p.3.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Frandsen failed to demonstrate error in the district court's evidentiary
ruling?

2.

Has Frandsen failed to establish that the district court abused its
discretion by imposing concurrent unified sentences of life, with 25 years
fixed, upon Frandsen's convictions for 10 counts of lewd conduct with his
biological daughter?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Frandsen Has Failed To Show Error In The Trial Court's Evidentiary Ruling

A.

Introduction
Dr. Kathryn Reese is the medical director for CARES and examined A.F.

after she disclosed that Frandsen had been sexually abusing her. (Tr., p.169,
Ls.16-24, p.192, L.17 - p.193, L.10.) While testifying for the state at trial, Dr.
Reese described, in general, the manner in which she performs a genital
examination on a female child who alleges sexual abuse, including by having
"the child lay back either in her mom's arms or on the table and have her spread
her legs in what's called a frog leg position .... " (Tr., p.174, L.18-p.175, L.13.)
To assist Dr. Reese in explaining to the jury what the "frog leg position" is, the
state sought to admit, as State's Exhibit 1, a diagram, taken from a medical
book, of a "woman holding a child and the child is in ... a frog leg position with
her genitalia open for viewing." (Tr., p.175, L.14 - p.176, L.8; see also State's
Exhibit 1.) Frandsen objected to the admission of the diagram, arguing:
Well, Your Honor, I guess I would be more comfortable of
[sic] an explanation of why this would be so helpful. I think we
know the examination happened. She can testify from the report. I
don't want the jury to be inflamed by anything portraying what may
have happened in the case during the exam.
(Tr., p.176, Ls.9-15.) In response, the prosecutor argued that using the proffered
diagram "would be less inflammatory" than putting "the actual pictures of [A.F.'s]
body up on the huge screen for everyone to see." (Tr., p.176, Ls.18-24.) The
court then clarified, "The objection is that this document is inflammatory?" (Tr.,
p.176, L.25 - p.177, L.1.) Frandsen's attorney responded, "It is just one of the
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pictures. I think one of the pictures is necessary. 111 The other picture showing
the position, I don't think, is necessary." (Tr., p.177, Ls.2-5.) After clarifying the
exhibit was simply a diagram from a medical book and not an actual photograph
of AF., the district court admitted the exhibit over Frandsen's objection, ruling, "I
don't find that that's inflammatory. I think it is certainly an aid to the jury in this
case." (Tr., p.177, Ls.6-18.)
On appeal, Frandsen argues the district court erred in admitting State's
Exhibit 1, contending it was both irrelevant and "highly prejudicial." (Appellant's
brief, pp.4-8.)

Frandsen's arguments fail for a number of reasons.

First,

Frandsen did not raise a relevance objection below and, as such, the issue is not
properly before this Court on appeal. Second, even assuming this Court deems
Frandsen's relevance argument preserved, correct application of the law to the
facts of this case shows the argument to be without merit. Third, Frandsen has
failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the exhibit
over Frandsen's objection that it was inflammatory. Finally, even assuming the
court erred in admitting the exhibit, any such error was harmless.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Generally Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not preserved

for appeal through an objection at trial." State v. Perry. 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245
P.3d 961, 976 (2010).

1

To further assist the jury in understanding Dr. Reese's testimony, the state also
introduced, as State's Exhibit 2, a "standard diagram of a female genitalia." (Tr.,
p.180, L.3 - p.181, L.3; see also State's Exhibit 2.) That exhibit was admitted
without objection. (Tr., p.180, L.17 - p.181, L.9.)
4

Relevance of evidence is reviewed de novo, but other questions of
admissibility of evidence are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

State v.

Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 143, 191 P.3d 217, 221 (2008); State v. Zichko, 129
Idaho 259, 264, 923 P.2d 966, 971 (1996); State v. Lamphere, 130 Idaho 630,
632, 945 P.2d 1, 3 (1997). In reviewing the trial court's exercise of discretion, an
appellate court determines whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the
issue as one involving the exercise of discretion; (2) acted within the outer
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable
to specific choices it had; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 143, 191 P.3d at 221; State v. Richmond, 137 Idaho 35,
37, 43 P.3d 794, 796 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing State v. Powell, 125 Idaho 889, 891,
876 P.2d 587, 589 (1994)).

C.

Frandsen Failed To Preserve For Appeal His Claim That The Diagram
Was Not Relevant
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely

objection must be made in the court below before an issue is preserved for
appeal. The specific ground for the objection must also be clearly stated." State
v. Gleason, 130 Idaho 586, 592, 944 P.2d 721, 727 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing I.R.E.
103(a)(1 ); State v. Babb, 125 Idaho 934, 940, 877 P.2d 905 (1994)). "For an
objection to be preserved for appellate review, either the specific ground for the
objection must be clearly stated, or the basis of the objection must be apparent
from the context." State v. Almaraz,_ Idaho_, 301 P.3d 242, 260 (2013)
(quoting State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 277, 77 P.3d 956, 966 (2003)); see
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also I.RE. 103(a)(1). Objecting to the admission of evidence on one basis does
not preserve a separate and different basis for exclusion of the evidence. State
v. Johnson, 126 Idaho 892, 896, 894 P.2d 125 (1995); State v. Higgins, 122
Idaho 590, 596, 836 P.2d 536 (1992); State v. Fordyce, 151 Idaho 868, 871, 264
P.3d 975, 978 (Ct. App. 2011); State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67,
76 (Ct. App. 2000); Gleason, 130 Idaho at 592, 944 P.2d at 727.
At trial, defense counsel initially objected to the admission of State's
Exhibit 1 on the stated basis that he "would be more comfortable of [sic] an
explanation of why this would be so helpful" and he did not "want the jury to be
inflamed by anything portraying what may have happened in the case during the
exam." (Tr., p.176, Ls.10-15.) Responding to what it apparently believed to be
the basis of Frandsen's objection, the state argued that showing the jury the
diagram would be "less inflammatory" than "put[ting] the actual pictures of
[A.F.'s) body up on the huge screen for everyone to see." (Tr., p.176, Ls.18-24.)
The court then gave Frandsen the opportunity to clarify the basis of his objection,
inquiring, 'The objection is that this document is inflammatory?" (Tr., p.176, L.25
- p.177, L.1.) Frandsen's attorney responded to the request for clarification, not
by asserting a relevance objection, but by asserting, "It is just one of the pictures.
I think one of the pictures is necessary. The other picture showing the position, I
don't think, is necessary." (Tr., p.177, Ls.2-5.)
On appeal, Frandsen attempts to equate defense counsel's argument that
the exhibit was not "necessary" with an assertion that it was "not necessary to
determine either his guilt or innocence" - i.e., it was not relevant. (Appellant's
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brief, pp.2, 4.) Frandsen's assertions on appeal notwithstanding, the context in
which defense counsel made the objection does not support such a reading.
There is no question that counsel never expressly invoked I.R.E. 401 or
otherwise specifically characterized the diagram as not "relevant."

Although

counsel claimed the diagram "showing the position" was not "necessary" he
appears in context to have been arguing it was not necessary because there was
another "picture" that would suffice to illustrate Dr. Reese's testimony; and he
made this assertion in direct response to the court's question whether the basis
of the objection was that the exhibit was inflammatory. (Tr., p.176, L.25 - p.177,
L.5.)

Given this context, it appears counsel's objection was actually that the

diagram was inflammatory because it was unnecessarily cumulative - not that
the diagram had no relevance at all.
Because Frandsen did not expressly state a relevance objection, and
because no such objection is apparent from the context of counsel's argument,
Frandsen failed to preserve for appeal the issue of whether State's Exhibit 1 was
relevant. This Court should thus decline to consider the issue.

D.

Even If Preserved, Frandsen's Appellate Claim That The Diagram Was
Not Relevant Fails; The Diagram Was Clearly Relevant For The Purpose
Of Illustrating Dr. Reese's Testimony
The state offered State's Exhibit 1 for the express purpose of "assist[ing]"

Dr. Reese "in describing how [she) provide[s] a genital exam to a child who
alleges sexual abuse."

(Tr., p.176, Ls.2-8.)

The district court admitted the

exhibit over Frandsen's objection, finding it was not inflammatory and was
"certainly an aid to the jury in this case."
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(Tr., p.177, Ls.10-13.)

Frandsen

argues on appeal that the diagram was not directly relevant to the jury's
determination of his guilt or innocence and, as such, was improperly admitted.
(Appellant's brief, pp.4-6.) Even assuming Frandsen's relevance argument was
preserved by way of a sufficiently specific objection below, it fails. The diagram
was clearly relevant for the purpose for which it was offered - i.e., illustrating Dr.
Reese's testimony- and was therefore properly admitted.
It has long been the law in Idaho that, to be admissible, illustrative
evidence need "only be relevant to the witness' testimony." State v. Stevens,
146 Idaho 139, 143, 191 P.3d 217, 221 (2008); State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho
758, 764, 864 P.2d 596, 602 (1993). Visual aids such as diagrams and videos
are examples of illustrative exhibits and are properly admitted if they actually
illustrate or explain the witness' testimony. See Stevens, 146 Idaho at 143-44,
191 P.3d at 221-22 (video illustrating doctor's testimony regarding methods he
used to determine whether child's injuries were result of fall was admissible to
illustrate doctor's testimony, regardless of its accuracy); Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho
at 764, 864 P.2d at 602 (diagram of crime scene relevant to illustrate officer's
testimony concerning details of his investigation).
In this case, Dr. Reese testified without objection regarding the manner in
which she performs genital examinations on female children alleging sexual
abuse.

(Tr., p.173, L.11 - p.175, L.13.)

Specifically, the doctor testified that

when performing such an exam, she is "looking for ... any signs of injuries such
as tears or bruising" and, to do so, she has "the child lay back either in her
mom's arms or on the table and have her spread her legs in what's called a frog
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leg position so [she] can look at [the child's] genital region.''. (Tr., p.174, Ls.1821, p.175, Ls.10-13.) State's Exhibit 1 is a diagram that illustrated for the jury
what the "frog leg position" is.

(Tr., p.175, L.21 - p.1761; State' Exhibit 1.)

According to Dr. Reese, the diagram was also helpful to "show that the child is
not in any discomfort or pain from [the] exam" and to show how the physician is
able to "view [the child's] vaginal area and her anal opening without any sign of
distress or stretching." (Tr., p.178, Ls.7-14.) Because the diagram clearly aided
Dr. Reese in her testimony by visually illustrating for the jury the manner in which
she performs genital examinations, similar to that performed on A.F. in this case,
the diagram was relevant and properly admitted for that purpose.

E.

The Diagram Was Not Unfairly Prejudicial
Pursuant to I.RE. 403, relevant evidence may be excluded if, in the

district court's discretion, the danger of unfair prejudice - which is the tendency
to suggest a decision on an improper basis - substantially outweighs the
probative value of the evidence. State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471, 248 P.3d
720, 722 (2010); State v. Floyd, 125 Idaho 651, 654, 873 P.2d 905, 907 (Ct.
App. 1994); State v. Nichols, 124 Idaho 651, 656, 862 P.2d 343, 348 (Ct. App.
1993). "Under the rule, the evidence is only excluded if the probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The rule suggests a
strong preference for admissibility of relevant evidence." State v. Martin, 118
Idaho 334, 340 n.3, 796 P.2d 1007, 1013 n.3 (1990) (emphasis in original).
Below, Frandsen did not identify any specific prejudice from the admission
of State's Exhibit 1, instead claiming in general terms that he did not "want the
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jury to be inflamed by anything portraying what may have happened in the case
during the exam."

(Tr., p.176, Ls.13-15.)

Expounding on this argument,

Frandsen now claims the exhibit was "highly prejudicial" and inflammatory
because, according to Frandsen, its only purpose "was to let the jury know that
A.F. sat naked in the arms of an adult with her legs spread open, exposing her
genitals to a stranger, Dr. Reese." (Appellant's brief, p.6; see also p.7 ("[T]his
exhibit only focused the jury on the fact that A.F. got naked in front of multiple
adults, while one adult held her legs open while the other adult examined her
genitalia."); p.8 (the exhibit "is just creepy, has no probative value and was highly
prejudicial as it would get the jury to think about A.F. in a compromised situation
while Dr. Reese performed her examination").)

Frandsen also claims the

"inflammatory effect of the exhibit" was "exacerbated" by Dr. Reese's testimony
that the "frog leg position" depicted in the diagram is only used with younger
children, thus "evoking sympathy" for the young victim. (Appellant's brief, pp.78.)

To the extent Frandsen's arguments are merely a rehashing of his claim
that the diagram had no probative value whatsoever, they fail for the reasons
already set forth in Section D, supra - i.e., the diagram was illustrative of Dr.
Reese's testimony. To the extent Frandsen argues the diagram encouraged the
jury to render its guilty verdicts based on sympathy for A.F., rather than on the
evidence showing that Frandsen repeatedly and protractedly committed lewd
acts upon A.F., such claim finds no support in either the record or the applicable
law.
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There is no question that the diagram depicts a child sitting naked in the
"frog leg position" on the lap of an adult. (See State's Exhibit 1) Contrary to
Frandsen's assertions, however, the exhibit could not have "focused the jury on
the fact that AF. got naked in front of multiple adults, while one adult held her
legs open while the other adult examined her genitalia" (Appellant's brief, p.7)
because, according to Dr. Reese's testimony, that is not the manner in which the
doctor conducted the examination of AF. Dr. Reese testified that "[w]ith older
children and with teenagers we have them on, just on a medical examining bed
. . . . So they would be just lying on a bed in a position similar to [the frog leg
position], but the parent would not be holding them there." (Tr., p.178, L.20 p.179, L.1.) A.F. was 12 years old when Dr. Reese examined her. (Tr., p.193,
Ls.4-6.) Regarding AF.'s exam, specifically, the doctor testified she "had [AF.]
lay on the bed" - not sit in the lap of an adult - for the genital examination. (Tr.,
p.200, Ls.12-23.) Moreover, as far as Dr. Reese's notes reflected, AF.'s mother
was not even there.

(Tr., p.193, L.24 - p.194, L.25.)

Because the evidence

showed AF. was not examined in the specific manner depicted in the diagram,
Frandsen's claim that the diagram "focused the jury" on the "fact" that she was
necessarily fails.
Regarding Frandsen's more general claims - that the exhibit was "just
creepy" and only served to evoke sympathy for AF. by demonstrating to the jury
that she had to go through the examination at all, such claims also fail to
demonstrate that the exhibit was unfairly prejudicial. The state agrees that, by its
nature, the diagram depicts an unpleasant circumstance.
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That it does so,

however, does not mean it was not admissible.

In criminal cases, relevant

evidence is often prejudicial in the sense that it is unpleasant or, in some cases,
even gruesome, but such does not mandate its exclusion from evidence. See,

s.9.:., State v. Winn, 121 Idaho 850, 853, 828 P.2d 879, 882 (1992) (fact that
photographs depict the body of a victim and the wounds inflicted on the victim
and may tend to excite the emotions of the jury does not mandate their exclusion
from evidence); State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 402, 958 P.2d 22, 28 (Ct. App.
1998) (same).

Rather, the trial court must exercise its discretion by balancing

the probative value of possibly inflammatory evidence against the risk of unfair
prejudice. Winn, 121 Idaho at 853, 828 P.2d at 882. Here, the court exercised
discretion in favor of admitting the diagram, finding it was "certainly an aid to the
jury" and was not "inflammatory." (Tr., p.177, Ls.10-13.) The court was correct.
State's

Exhibit 1 is not an

actual photograph or other graphic

representation of a child in what Frandsen refers to as a "compromised
situation." (Appellant's brief, p.8.) It is instead a rather simple and sterile blackand-white drawing illustrating the "frog leg position" Dr. Reese referred to in her
testimony.

Although the subject-matter of the diagram is itself unpleasant,

nothing about the diagram is so intensely graphic that it would have caused a
juror to decide the case based on an emotional response to it. Nor did anything
about the diagram pose more of a danger of evoking sympathy for A.F. than the
unobjected to testimony Dr. Reese gave about exam procedure itself. In short,
nothing about the exhibit was so prejudicial as to suggest a decision on improper
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basis. Frandsen's arguments to the contrary are without merit and fail to show
an abuse of discretion in the admission of the diagram.

F.

Any Error Was Harmless
Even if Frandsen has met his burden of showing error in the admission of

State's Exhibit 1, any such error is harmless. "Where a defendant alleges error
at trial that he contemporaneously objected to, this Court reviews the error on
appeal under the harmless error test." Almaraz, 258-259 (citation omitted).

Idaho at -

, 301 P.3d at

"[T]he error is harmless if the Court finds that the

result would be the same without the error." Id. at_, 301 P.3d at 256 (citation
omitted).
Frandsen was charged with 10 counts of lewd conduct, committed with his
biological daughter, A.F.

(R., pp.9-15.)

At trial, A.F. testified in excruciating

detail to the many and varied acts of sexual misconduct Frandsen perpetrated
against her over a period of four years, beginning when she was just seven years
old. (Tr., p.89, L.14 - p.127, L.19.) Specifically, she testified that during that
four-year period, Frandsen repeatedly touched her vagina, forced her to engage
in oral sex, and vaginally and anally raped her. (Id; see also Tr., p.288, Ls.14-28
(court noting at sentencing that "conduct occurred over a period of four years"
and "involv[ed] virtually every type of lewd and lascivious conduct that there can
be as defined under this statute").)

Although Frandsen took the stand and

denied the allegations (see Tr., p.216, L.13 - p.237, L.11 ), even he admitted,
after trial, that A.F.'s testimony was "compelling" and that "[e]ven [he] wanted to
take [himself] outside and kick [his] own ass." (PSE, p.6; Tr., p.292, Ls.9-13.)
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A.F.'s testimony was also corroborated to some extent by the results of her
physical examination, which showed evidence of vaginal penetration.

(Tr.,

p.201, L.2 - p.202, L.24, p.207, Ls.6-12.)
Given the compelling nature of A.F.'s testimony and evidence that tended
to corroborate it, there is no reasonable possibility that the jury's verdict would
have been different had State's Exhibit 1 not been admitted. If there was error, it
was harmless.

11.
Frandsen Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The District Court's Sentencing
Discretion
A.

Introduction
Frandsen argues the concurrent unified sentences of life, with 25 years

fixed, imposed upon his convictions for 10 counts of lewd conduct with his
biological daughter are excessive in light of factors he claims are mitigating,
including his "turbulent childhood," his failure to benefit from treatment
associated with his prior adjudicated sex offenses, his military service and his
ability to maintain employment. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-10.) Frandsen has failed
to show an abuse of discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review

only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d
397, 401 (2007). The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that the
sentencing court abused its discretion.

&
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C.

Frandsen Has Failed To Show His Sentence Is Excessive Under Any
Reasonable View Of The Facts
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden

of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho
576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11
P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden the appellant must show that the sentence
is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577,
38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to achieve the
primary objective of protecting society or any of the related sentencing goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution.

kl

At sentencing, the district court articulated the correct legal standards
applicable to its sentencing decision and set forth in thoughtful and exhaustive
detail its reasons for imposing concurrent unified sentences of life, with 25 years
fixed. (Tr., p.275, L.1 - p.296, L.14.) The court recognized the factors Frandsen
claims are mitigating but determined the sentence was necessary in light of the
egregious nature of the offenses, Frandsen's complete failure to accept
responsibility for his actions, his history of prior sex offenses with family
members, and the psychosexual evaluator's determination that Frandsen poses
a medium-high to high risk to sexually reoffend.

(Id.) The state submits that

Frandsen has failed to establish an abuse of discretion, for reasons more fully
set forth in the attached excerpt of the sentencing hearing (Appendix A), which
the state adopts as its argument on appeal.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Frandsen's judgment
and sentences.
DATED this 10th day of October 2013.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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Appendix A
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address the court. You're not required to do so. Do
you wish to make a statement, sir?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor, I do.
THE COURT: Please, go ahead.
THE DEFENDANT: What I would like to say, Your
Honor, is that, you know, on April 5th I had the right
of a jury trial. I lost it. It's been my experience
that when something like that happens, I don't agree
with the conclusion of the jury, what the jury did, but
what the jury's verdict was is what the jury's verdict
was. So I have to do what I have to do. I have to do
what's required of me.
See, prior, even prior to when these
allegations came out in December of 2010, I knew there
was something wrong with my daughter. I tried to get
her - I didn't know what it was, you know. And I
guess the ultimate irony is that the actions I was
taking to try to help my daughter is ultimately what
led me here. You know, I guess I'm the cause of it.
That's where I need to be.
I would only ask, Your Honor, that I think
I have demonstrated that I, you know -- excuse me. I'm
trying to do what's right for not only my children, for
Alex, for my ex-wife, you know, I just- I have
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25 children. I need to get back to be able to support
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1
THE COURT: Sentencing is a matter of discretion
2 for this court. I think it's important to note that in
3 exercising that discretion I have to act within the
4 bounds of law, and I have to consider the appropriate
factors that are authorized by law in making the
6 sentencing decision. Those factors, in my view, are the
7 elements set forth in Idaho Code Section 19-2521, the
8 reasons given by our legislature for a court imposing a
9 sentence of probation versus those reasons for the court
10 imposing a sentence of incarceration.
11
Balanced against that statutory scheme is
12 what I consider the case law factors outlined by our
5
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appellate courts in Idaho as to the policy reasons for
decisions in sentencing. That being: First, concepts
of rehabilitation to the defendant; concepts of
deterrence, meaning that the court's sentence should
send a message both to the defendant as well as to
society at large; third, the concepts of retribution,
which means punishment simply for punishment sake; last,
what I think everyone recognizes as the controlling law
in Idaho is that a sentence should be imposed taking
into consideration the good order and protection of
society.
In fashioning a sentence in this case, I
have considered all of those factors. I do intend to
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1 them. I realize the chances are i'ii never be abie to
2 see them again, but right now they're struggling, and as
3 their father, that is something that, I mean, it's
4 something that I need to rectify as best as I can. You
5 know, so that's all that I would ask, Your Honor, is
6 that I be given the chance eventually to be able to get
7 something going again.
8
THE COURT: Thank you, sir.
Mr. Beus, is there any reason, legal in
9
1O nature, why sentence should not be imposed today?
11
MR. BEUS: No, Your Honor.
12
THE COURT: Let me begin by noting that the
13 victim in this case during the course of Mr. Frandsen's
14 statements bolted out of the courtroom so she is not
15 sitting here listening to my remarks. I guess that's
16 her decision to make if she doesn't want to sit through
17 these court proceedings, but I note that she does have
18 the right to be here as the victim in this case.
19
The factors that - and the victim has now
20 returned to court. Ma'am, either stay in here or not
21 stay in here as you wish.
22
THE VICTIM: I'm sorry.
23
THE COURT: But let's not make a show out of
24 this.
25
THE VICTIM: Okay.
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discuss virtually every one of these in the statute
today. The record should reflect that if I miss one or
two in my comments I'm very familiar with this code
section and it is my intention to have considered all of
5 the factors authorized by Idaho law.
6
With that explanation, let me start in this
7 fashion. First, Mr. Frandsen, as to the jury's verdict
8 in this case, I do find that they, in fact, found you
9 guilty of ten counts, and that verdict, of course, has
10 been entered in this case and you stand convicted of
11 ten counts of lewd and lascivious conduct that occurred
12 between 2006 and 2010, roughly a four-year span. These
13 counts are self-explanatory in not only the jury's
14 verdict, but in the Indictment in this case. They
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include, as Madam Prosecutor has stated, virtually
every type of lewd and lascivious conduct that an adult
could commit upon a minor child, everything from -well, I'll just leave it at that.
I mention that because this case is not a
situation of an isolated incident. It's not a situation
of one act. It's a situation of, as Madam Prosecutor
said, multiple acts over multiple periods of time,
under multiple circumstances. And, ultimately, as we
know, over the history of the life of this defendant
it's a situation where there have been multiple
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minor things, but I'm not concerned about those. But in
1
terms of prior delinquency in terms of sexual activity,
2
there is no question in my mind that this defendant has
3
4
had a lifetime history of criminal activity in the
sexual realm.
5
6
Frankly, when I read this psychosexual
evaluation and found out, and the presentence report,
7
and found out about the history of the admitted sexual
8
9
contact between the defendant and his two sisters at
the ages of both them and himself, and the reports are
10
11
clear about the ages so I don't need to read that all
in the record, and even the cousin, I was somewhat
12
shocked because I have a hard time understanding how a 13
defendant at ages five to 11 could have been involved
14
in vaginal intercourse, fondling and cunnilingus with a
15
child ages three to nine, with the same type of similar
16
conduct with the other sister and similar conduct,
17
though it may be -- it's different, but it's still
18
lewd and lascivious conduct for the cousin.
19
For purposes of the record, Mr. Beus, I
20
recognize there is a great dispute over the conduct
21
with the male in this case. I don't place a lot of
22
reliance upon that and I will -- it's there. I'm not
23
going to strike it from the reports, but I don't think
24
that - I will say for this record that I am not
25
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commit X, that gives you one point. If you commit Y,
you get two points, and so forth. Sometimes that
becomes rather callous in terms of those evaluations
and I understand that. I also understand the defense's
argument that by relying on the prior male victim issue
that that skews the results of those tests.
On the other hand, we also have something
called the Sexual Violence Risk Evaluation -- and these
are all evaluations that are approved by professionals
in the field and that's why we have these evaluations
completed -- with 20 risk factors that are involved.
And the report doesn't list out what the 11 of those 20
risk factors were. I presume it probably includes some
of those that were included in the other two tests. I
don't know that for sure, but, nevertheless, the
results of that evaluation indicate that there is
still a high risk to re-offend sexually from this
defendant.
A third thing that I could look at, if I
had the information available, is what a person has
done during the course of the case or during the course
of investigation or even after conviction to demonstrate
an amenability to treatment. I have zero information
in this case as to Mr. Frandsen's amenability to
treatment as to sexual offenses. I have information
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focusing upon that factor in this case as being
significant as to that particular child.
Is the defendant's criminal conduct the
result of circumstances unlikely to recur? I look at
at least two things. Number one, I look at the history
of this man. Common sense tells me that one of the
best indicators of where you're going to be tomorrow is
where you've been in the past. People do change in
life. People make mistakes in life. We all make
mistakes. Sometimes we learn from those mistakes.
Sometimes we don't. What is particularly troubling to
this court is that we have a man who is 35 years of age
who is engaging in inappropriate sexual contact with a
minor and that he's had this history of this since he
was literally a child himself. That would certainly
indicate to me that the chances of future recurrence is
significant.
The other factor I look at is the
psychosexual evaluation in this case. Now, number one,
this evaluation I think was thorough. I think it was
well done, I think, in terms of the testing, the
evaluations that were used and so forth. I fully
recognize that things such as the Static and the RRASOR
tests can certainly lead to wrong conclusions because
they are basically scored. In other words, if you
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with regard to his amenability to treatment in the
mental health evaluation that is part of this record,
but I think that is a far cry from treatment in the
sexual field.
If there are other factors that the court
should be looking at as to the likeliness or
unlikeliness of reoccurrence, I don't know what they
are because I don't see them in this record in any
event.
What is the character and attitude of the
defendant with regard to indicating that the commission
of another crime is likely or unlikely? That goes to
the heart of the problem in sexual offenses. The
evaluator in this case has clearly stated that this
defendant has no remorse. He has no acceptance of
responsibility.
I've looked at the polygraph. It is, as
Mr. Beus has correctly said, I think, inconclusive. I,
frankly, had never seen a polygraph use that kind of a
statement before. I read it and I re-read it and I
re-read it thinking what am I missing here? The
evaluator seems to say there is an indication of
deception, but I'm not going to make any opinions about
that. For purposes of this record, I am going to
totally disregard the polygraph because I don't think
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it's helpful to anybody, and l don't think the
psychosexual evaluator placed any undue reliance on
that in any event.
The factors that deal with imprisonment are
these:
Is there an undue risk that during a period
of a suspended sentence the defendant will commit
another crime? I have to conclude in this case,
Mr. Frandsen that there is an undue risk, or at least a
risk that I'm not comfortable accepting that you would,
during a period of probation if the court were to
consider that, make it likely that you would commit
another sexual offense because that's your whole history
in life. I just don't have any other evidence to
convince me otherwise.
I always ask myself in these cases, if I
were to put this defendant on probation today, could I
go home tonight and sleep well knowing that society is
protected and have a good feeling in my stomach, so to
speak, that this type of conduct would not occur again?
If I get that feeling, then I'll put somebody on
probation. If I don't think that, then I'm going to put
them in the penitentiary. Unfortunately for you, I
reach the second conclusion in this case, and I have no
confidence that you would not, if placed in a situation
285
you would have convicted yourself. You said that as
much in your reports that when you heard that testimony
you would have convicted yourself. I think what that
does is it puts you into a very difficult position.
Certainly, you are certainly free to
maintain that position, but in terms of my knowledge of
how to deal with sexual offenders, once you take that
position and you are not accepting any responsibility
for what's occurred here, I think it virtually means
that you are not amenable to treatment and you continue
to be a risk. I think that's exactly what the
psychosexual evaluator is saying in this case, though,
she didn't say it in those exact words.
Will a lesser sentence depreciate the
seriousness of the defendant's crime? When I look at
lewd and lascivious cases, l recognize that the
legislature of this state have placed this crime as one
of the most significant crimes in terms of potential
punishment that we have. It ranks up there with murder,
robberies, certain types of drug offenses which are not
relevant here, but there are not very many crimes that
carry a potential life sentence.
It certainly is easy for one to start
through the thinking process of saying, well, just
because somebody has been convicted of lewd and
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1 involving younger children again, given your situation
2 in life, I think it's just a question of time before
3

there's a re-offense.

Is the defendant in need of correctional
4
5 treatment that could be provided most effectively by
his commitment to an institution? In that regard I
look strongly at the recommendations in the psychosexual
evaluation. Page seven of that report says this,
quote, "Mr. Frandsen is not amenable to community
treatment. He has not taken responsibility for these
crimes, has minimized his past sexual offenses, and
shows no remorse for the harm he has caused his
victims," unquote.
One of the difficulties for a defendant in
a case like this that goes to trial where a defendant
16 maintains his innocence is that he's in the proverbial
17 catch 22 position. Certainly, Mr. Frandsen had the
18 right to go to trial in this case and. there's nothing
19 about that process that I in any way hold against him
20 and the record needs to be crystal clear about that.
21 But, when you have a defendant who in the face of a
22 community verdict of 12 persons in this community, in
23 the face of what I thought was Clear evidence of ten
24 counts of lewd and lascivious conduct because, frankly,
25 Mr. Frandsen, I would have convicted you too. Frankly,
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1 lascivious conduct that you should put somebody in the
2 penitentiary for life because that's what the
3 legislature sets as a maximum. I don't subscribe to
4 that theory. I believe that you have to look at each
5 individual case. You have to look at the nature of the
6 case. You have to look at the particular types of
7 conduct involved because as we all know, those of us in
8 the system know, you see all levels of lewd and
9 lascivious cases. Those from what I call the grandpa
10 touching cases, to the cases involving the, you know,
11 the 20-year-old and the 15-year-old, to the ones that
12 are the more extreme cases, which is what we have in
13 this case which I consider to be a very aggravated type
14 of lewd and lascivious conduct.
This conduct occurred over a period of four
15
years,
and
as
I said earlier, involves virtually every
16
17 type of lewd and lascivious conduct that there can be
18 as defined under this statute. This puts this case at
19 the far extreme end of seriousness as far as this court
20 is concerned. iherefore, I think it is appropriate
21 that the sentence in this case has to reflect that.
22
Will imprisonment provide appropriate
23 punishment and deterrence to the defendant? That, as
24 well as the next factor, which is appropriate deterrence
25 to other persons in the community, is always an issue
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that I wrestle with in any criminal case. If sentences
were to provide true deterrence to the public, we would
never be sitting here in this case because people would
recognize that if they didn't want to go to the
penitentiary for a long period of time they wouldn't
commit these offenses to begin with.
But, there is certainly a societal value,
if you will, in a sentence that's imposed. When the
public reads that a court system imposes light
punishment for serious crimes, it certainly skews the
world's view of how our legal system works. So there
is an element of deterrence that comes from it in that
sense.
In terms of particular deterrence to this
defendant, I don't know what a significant sentence
would do. It's probably one of these factors I put at
the lowest end of the policy factors that I'm
considering.
Is the defendant a multiple offender or
professional criminal? I've always interpreted this
statute to mean this: that if you have a defendant who
has been convicted of multiple felonies, then they
became a multiple offender or professional criminal.
But it also involves what we have in this case, multiple
offenders in terms of victims. In this case, because

1 of what I said earlier about this defendant's juveniie
2 record, we certainly do have that present here.
3

The state says that Mr. Frandsen has an
antisocial personality disorder. The psychosexual
10 evaluation reaches that conclusion. The evaluation of
11 Mr. Jones, the mental health evaluator who conducted an
12 evaluation last year doesn't seem to reach that
13 conclusion. The court is mindful that these become
14 opinions of evaluators. Different evaluators are going
15 to reach different conclusions based upon how they want
16 to interpret what they see.
I don't know whether Mr. Frandsen is a
17
true,
has
a
true
antisocial personality disorder, but I
18
19 do believe that he has attributes of that. And as the
20 evaluator and Dr. Tyson stated, it appears that he has
21 a long-term pattern of manipulating, exploiting or
22 violating the rights of others. At least in that
23 definition, I think that is true in this case. The
24 manipulation that occurred with regard to his daughter
25 in this case certainly places him in that category.
8

9
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Has Mr. Frandsen done some good things in
life? Yes, he has. He's been employed for periods of
time. He's served our country. He's provided support
for his family from time to time. Obviously I don't
expect him to be able to do that now since he's
incarcerated. So it is not a question that we have an
individual here who has not provided anything
productive in this community. I won't go that far, and
I recognize that he certainly has some positive things
in his life.
Does he abide by court orders? I think he
does in terms of release and so forth. Do those things
outweigh the conduct that has occurred in this case?
Clearly not, in my view. You know, the fact of the
matter is that, and I think this is what Mrs. Craig was
alluding to in her opening remarks at sentencing, is
that sexual offenses involving children are,
unfortunately, committed by people that look like they
are just normal people living in our society. This
crime is the undisclosed one.
I can't tell you the number of times that I
have seen people that look like they fit the normal
profile of just a normal American person who has been
engaged in manipulation and violation of children. So
the fact of just looking at what somebody does on the
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He's also a multiple offender simply because

4 of the number of counts that he's been convicted of in
5 this case. It may be that there is only one victim, but
6 certainly multiple counts make him a multiple offender
7 and I take that into consideration here.

1

outside in terms of the way they exist in society

2 doesn't tell me much about what their true attitude
3 and views of life are with regard to violation of
4 children's rights.
5
Both the presentence investigation report
6 and the psychosexual report speak of certain statements
7 that this defendant has made during the course of the
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presentence investigation and the evaluation process.
I'm looking particularly at page six of the psychosexual
report because I think it repeats some of the same
things that the PSI report says. He stated, quote,
"Her testimony was very compelling. Even I wanted to
take myself outside and kick my own ass," unquote. An
interesting view of a victim's testimony.
"When asked directly if he abused his
daughter, the defendant stated, quote, 'I'm saying I do
not remember it happening,"' unquote. That is an
interesting statement. If that statement really means
what it says on its face, that I do not remember having
multiple acts of sexual activity with my daughter over
the course of four years, then we have a man here who
has the most significant mental defect that I've ever
seen from somebody that's been before this court
before. If it means I don't remember each and every
incident, that's understandable. But, and this is his
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words, "I do not remember it happening." If that's a
statement of simply I deny that I did it, then I
understand what that statement means, but it is of
concern to me.
"When asked if he suffered a condition
that at any time would compromise his memory, he stated
no. When pressed further on the issue of the abuse, he
stated, quote, 'It didn't happen,"' unquote. Again,
that goes back to what I said earlier is that we have a
defendant here who has gone to trial. He's testified,
"I didn't do it." He's been convicted and he's now
placed in that catch 22 situation where he's probably
not going to admit that he did it.
The most significant thing that I think
that the defendant has said in this case which affects
my decision for sentencing in this case is the next
statement. "When asked to share his feelings regarding
the crimes he was convicted of, he stated, quote, 'My
thought is that if he - that if somebody does that,
they should be taken into the alley and be shot. It's
reprehensible,"' unquote.
Mr. Frandsen, I can't take you into the
alley and shoot you, nor would I do that. That would
certainly not be appropriate. What I can do is put you
in the penitentiary for a long period of time.
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The question then is, how much of that
should be fixed? It is, with any sentencing process, a
combination of considering the seriousness of the
offense, the nature of the offense, the need for what I
call age development in a defendant so that he or she
outgrows the conduct that gets them into the criminal
system. I think that there's significant evidence that
as people get older their likelihood of re-offense
decreases. Where that line is changes with everybody.
I don't have statistics that answer that question, nor
do I have an opinion in this case as to what amount of
time is necessary in the penitentiary before that risk
factor goes away, but I know it's some period of time
in this case.
What really drives me in this case,
Mr. Frandsen, is what I've said already. This, in my
view, is an aggravated and a very aggravated lewd and
lascivious case. It's more than one count of Land L.
It's more than one count of just touching. As I said,
it involves each and every type of lewd and lascivious
conduct that can be prosecuted by the state in these
cases. I think the good order and protection of society
requires a significant punishment component in this
case, as well as a significant component to keep you out
of society for a long period of time. For that reason,
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This is not a probation case by any means.

2 It's not a retained jurisdiction case by any means.
3 The only question in my mind, as I sit here now and as
4 I have a sat and listened to this case from the time
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1

you were convicted through the sentencing process, is
whether or not you should ever see the light of day
again.
The state has not asked for a fixed life
sentence in this case. I thought they were doing that
at the outset, Ms. Craig, but I don't think that's what
you're asking for now. I don't think that a fixed life
sentence in this case would be appropriate because
under the law, as I understand it, I have to be
convinced that there is no possibility of rehabilitation
for a defendant. Though I have great concerns about
this defendant's ability to be rehabilitated, I cannot
make the conclusion that he could never be rehabilitated
and I think that's the criteria for a fixed life
sentence.
On the other hand, I do have concerns that
the good order and protection of society mandates a
significant penitentiary sentence in this case and that
you need to be supervised by law enforcement for the
rest of your natural life. That is why I am going to
impose a unified life sentence in this case.
294
I am going to accept the state's recommendation in this

2 case and impose a 25-year fixed part of this unified
3 life sentence.
4
I will decline to order restitution in this
5 case, Madam Prosecutor, even though I think it is owed
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because I think it is a futile act and I think it is
simply -- well, it's a futile act and I decline to do
that. I will decline also to impose court costs in
this case or public defender reimbursement given the
length account of this penitentiary sentence.
So it is clear for the record, this is a
unified sentence of life in the Idaho State
Penitentiary, 25 years fixed, life indeterminate to be
served.
You have the right to appeal this decision,
as well as all decisions of this court and the jury in
this case, Mr. Frandsen. You must perfect that appeal
within 42 days of today. If you wish to do that,
notify Mr. Beus and he will do that for you.
You'll be remanded to the custody of the
sheriff for transport to the penitentiary system to
commence serving this sentence.
The court is in recess.
(Court recessed at 3:55 p.m.)
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